HOLY HERESY? A. B. SIMPSON, SANCTIFICATION, AND APPOLINARIANISM
by
Bernie A. Van De Walle
Albert Benjamin Simpson, noted preacher, publisher, and founder of the Christian and Missionary Alliance, lived and thrived in the theology and spirituality of the late nineteenth century Holiness Movement. He was both its benefactor and beneficiary. His teaching regarding sanctification in particular was widely disseminated through international, national, and regional conferences, through the students of his Missionary Training Institute, and through the periodicals and books that seemed to flow ceaselessly from his pen.
His complex doctrine of sanctification is founded upon the believer’s gaining of the mind of Christ. Apart from this acquisition, the pursuit of holiness is futile. It is the mind of Christ, resident in the believer, that empowers humanity to effectively complete its divine mandate and be all that God has created it to be.
When one investigates what Simpson meant by the “mind of Christ,” however, one may begin to legitimately ask whether Simpson’s understanding treads upon the ground of an historic heresy. When describing this “mind of Christ” that the believer is to gain, Simpson is clear to note that this mind is singular and is solely divine. As such, Simpson’s Christology may be Apollinarian, that Christological position directly anathematized at the First Council of Constantinople in 381 CE. Of particular practical consequence is that, if Simpson’s Christology is heretical, especially in relation to the nature of the mind of Christ, then his soteriology is also heretical and an inadequate model. This bears practical significance because Simpson’s soteriology and his doctrine of sanctification are peculiar neither to himself nor to the Christian and Missionary Alliance. They are shared by many, especially those associated with the historic Holiness Movement. This essay, however, will show that, while Simpson may have held an Apollinarian Christology, he may be saved from heresy by an uncommon anthropology that understands the proper spirit of all humanity to be essentially divine.
Defining Apollinarian Christology
Apollinaris the Younger was renowned for his dedication to the church and serious scholarship. This fourth-century figure was a student of Theodotus of Laodicea,[1] a “friend and coadjutor” of Athanasius,[2] and, for a period, a teacher of Jerome.[3] This “first great defender of Orthodoxy”[4] possessed an unusually sharp mind and was a profound theologian.[5] He is considered to have been to one to have introduced the term hypostasis—a “self-determining reality”—to Christological discussion.[6] His stellar reputation as both a devoted churchman and a superior intellect provided the heretical movement that would follow him its admission to and early popularity in the church.[7]
While it may date back as early as 352 CE, it is not until the Council of Alexandria in 362 “that [Apollinarian] teaching had become a public issue.”[8] It was another decade before it became a serious matter. Unlike those heresies that arise from either ignorance or carelessness, Apollinarianism is said to be the result of “the most subtle and thorough-going attempt to work out a theory of Christ’s Person in the fourth century.”[9] Even in his error, Apollinaris shows his depth of understanding “of the Christological problem:”[10] that is, how are we to understand that Jesus Christ is, at one and the same time, both fully human and fully divine and yet one person? For his part, Apollinaris sought to defend the unity of the person of Christ, opposing any Christology that would propose that the Incarnation resulted in two Sons, two selves, or any other dualism. He insisted, instead, that in the Incarnation the person of Jesus Christ was clearly and utterly one.
Apollinaris understood humanity to be a trichotomy of being: a body, a sensate soul, and a rational spirit. He asserted that when Christ took on human form he took on the body and the sensate soul but did not take on a human rational spirit or mind. It is in this denial of Christ’s possession of a human mind or spirit that Apollinaris’ heresy is found; the mind of Christ was both singular and solely divine. There were not two minds in the person or Christ; one human and one divine. There was one mind, one spirit, and it was wholly and only divine.
Apollinaris rejected the idea that the person of Christ possessed a human mind for two separate but related reasons. The first was the essential mutability of the human mind. He believed that the synthesis or the cooperation of a human mind with a divine mind within one person presented a logical impossibility. That is, something that is essentially mutable and given to vacillation—the human mind—cannot be truly joined to something that is essentially immutable and constant—the divine mind. The two were mutually exclusive. The latter simply could not work with the former. Eventually, such an arrangement would result in a difference of purpose or action. There could be no such division in the person of Christ.
The second reason for the rejection of a human mind or spirit was that it was necessarily bound to sin. Given human weakness and the mutability of the human mind, sooner or later, a non-divine free-will would err. Should Jesus have possessed a human mind, he would possess something “changeable and the prey of filthy thoughts but being Himself divine [he possessed a divine mind], changeless, heavenly.”[11] Certainly, the Incarnate Son of God could not tolerate a mind that not only had the possibility but the eventuality of sin.
Not surprisingly, Apollinaris’ own view was a logical extension of the Alexandrian school of which he was a part and “which, simply, stressed the divinity of Christ.”[12] Apollinaris’ view clearly asserted the conjoining, the union, of the divine and the human in the Incarnation, but refused to do so in any way that might compromise the fullness of the divine nature. In so doing, his opposition would assert, he essentially sacrificed the humanity of Christ on the altar of his divinity.[13]
While Apollinaris’ doctrine of the Incarnation is complex, that particular aspect which has gained the most attention and has been declared heretical is found in his “single affirmation that the divine spirit of God the Son was substituted in the Redeemer for a human mind. When Apollinaris said that God took flesh, or, as he very often expressed it, God took a body, he meant exactly what he said and no more.”[14] That is, with the Incarnation, God took on a human body with its attendant sensory abilities and various properties, but he did not take on a human mind. While it is more nuanced and more complicated that simply this, “the rejection of a human mind in Jesus was [Apollinarianism’s] salient feature.”[15]
While the supposed advantages of an Apollinarian Christology are the assurance of the divine singularity of purpose in the person of Christ and the consequent surety of his sinlessness and, therefore, his suitability to serve as savior, the shortcomings of such a Christology are significant. The ultimate critique against Apollinaris’ teaching is that it was, essentially, docetic—the savior was not a real man; he only appeared to be so. Historian J. N. D. Kelly noted that if the Word “lacked the most characteristic element in man’s make-up, a rational mind and will, His alleged manhood was not in the strict sense human, but must have been something monstrous; it is absurd to call Him a man at all, since He was not a man according to the accepted definition.”[16]
The Cappodocians, many centuries before Kelly, echoed his critique. Since it is the mind which is “the most essential part of man,”[17] how could Christ be considered truly or fully human if he lacked this most distinctive aspect of human being? Certainly, he cannot. For the Cappodocians, Apollinarianism proved to be especially problematic because they asserted that only that which was taken up by the Saviour could be redeemed. If Christ, therefore, did not have a human mind, could he truly have redeemed humanity in its fullness, especially if the aspect that is not taken up is the most essential or distinct aspect of humanity? The answer throughout church history has been a clear and unequivocal “No.”
Defining Simpson’s Christology
There is, of course, no doubt that Simpson would have considered his own Christology orthodox.[18] The difficulties with accepting self-definition, however, are either that one rarely realizes one’s own heterodoxy or one is rarely willing to admit the inadequacy of one’s own definitions.[19] If, therefore, we are to make a decision regarding Simpson’s Christology, we must move beyond his own opinion of such to an actual investigation of his assertions in the area.
There is no doubt that Simpson, at the very least, asserted that Jesus Christ was the theandric one. Jesus Christ was the real intersection of the human and divine. Christ, he said, neither simply appeared to be human nor did he simply appear to be divine. He was, in essence, in Himself, the intersection of both. In keeping with historic Christian witness in this area, Simpson noted that it is Christ’s theandric nature, and neither his human nature nor his divine nature alone, that qualifies him to act as the mediator between God and humanity. The question of orthodoxy, however, is not answered solely on whether one asserts that Christ is theandric. Other questions must be answered, including the extent to which he is understood to be divine and human. It is in this area that Apollinarianism was defective and, so, it is to this area that we will turn in our investigation of Simpson’s Christology.
On a number of occasions, in line with the historic confession of the church, Simpson asserted Jesus’ divinity. He did so both explicitly and implicitly. Explicitly, he made a number of statements regarding Christ’s divinity, including referring to “the transcendent glory of His Deity,”[20] to “His supreme divinity,”[21] and to Christ himself as “the one God.”[22] Simpson also noted that one cannot assert knowledge of God apart from knowledge of Christ, in that God is seen most clearly in the person of Christ Himself.[23]
Implicitly, too, Simpson asserted the divinity of Christ. This occurs through his identification of certain divine attributes with Christ. He wrote that Jesus, “the Word[,] possesses all the attributes that God possesses.”[24] More specifically, he identified Christ as the source of life, spiritual and otherwise.[25] Other examples include Simpson’s assertion that, following Christ’s resurrection, he possessed, in some sense, omnipresence.[26] Simpson also notes Christ’s omnipotence[27] and even granted Jesus’ omniscience,[28] an attribute that he carries as one who has the very mind of God. Christ was always divine and bore these attributes, even if they were enveloped or shrouded by his humanity.[29]
While Simpson asserted Christ’s divinity, he also asserted his real humanity. He believed, as with Jesus’ divinity, that his humanity was necessary to his mediatorial role[30] and that he continues to be human in the present.[31] Not only did Simpson assert Christ’s humanity, but he asserted his full or perfect humanity. By this, he meant two separate things. In the first place, he meant that in the person of Jesus Christ we see the archetype of human nature,[32] the “heavenly pattern,”[33] a “perfect humanity,”[34] and the “ideal man, the pattern of what a man should be . . ..”[35] In Christ, we see humanity as it ought to be—the perfect example.
In the second place, Simpson meant that, in the Incarnation, Jesus took on the whole of what it means to be human.[36] He was the “partaker of our complete humanity in the fullest sense,”[37] in the “widest sense,”[38] yet, of course, was without sin.[39] In doing so, Simpson spoke of humanity as constituted by a number of aspects or components. The categories that he used, however, were not consistent. At times, Simpson used dichotomist language, identifying humanity as constituted of two aspects; a body and a soul. When he used this kind of language, it was not his intent to exhaustively define the various aspects of a human being. Rather, he used the phrase “body and soul” as a merism referring to humanity in its totality. He was not making the case that these two particular aspects form the whole of humanity. When it is Simpson’s intent to do so, he preferred, instead, to describe humanity trichotomistically, composed of a body, a soul, and a spirit. Each of these referred to something specific that together constituted humanity in its entirety.[40]
By “body,” Simpson referred to humanity’s physical aspect, the actual flesh and bones of a human being. By “soul,” Simpson did not refer to the whole of non-physical being as he inferred when he spoke dichotomistically. The terms “soul” and “spirit,” he argued, are not merely synonymous.[41] Each means something specific. By the “soul,” or the “psychical man,”[42] Simpson meant that physical part of humanity that learns and knows the world around it. The “soul” is the home of the intellectual and emotional aspects of humanity.[43] Jesus was such a “psychical man.” Furthermore, he noted, that in his humanity, in his soul, Jesus had a growing and maturing knowledge of the world around him. That is, while Jesus was, from the time of his conception, always fully divine, in his humanity, given that he had a soul, he was initially limited in knowledge, even in regard to his own identity and mission.[44]
In asserting the full humanity of Jesus, Simpson clearly noted that Jesus not only took on human flesh and had a human soul, but also possessed a spirit. By “spirit,” Simpson did not merely note that there is something to a human being beyond simply a physical body. By the term “spirit,” Simpson denoted something particular and distinct from “soul,” as previously defined. For Simpson, the spirit bears two abilities not possessed by the soul, one intellectual and the other relational. Simpson identifies the spiritual aspect of humanity as “the higher and divine life which links us directly to God, and enables us to know and to come into relationship with divine things”[45] [emphasis mine]. First, the human spirit is that which had innate consciousness not only of the very existence of the spiritual realm but, more particularly, of God himself. While the soul possesses real and honorable knowledge,[46] it is incapable of grasping “the great thoughts of God.”[47] The spirit is uniquely equipped not only to recognize but to understand spiritual matters. The spirit alone is that aspect of a human being which is able to know the loftier things of God, those things beyond the ability and capacity of the non-spiritual human psychical understanding. In fact, it is the spirit that enables humanity to know those things which it was created to know.
Second, the “spirit” is that facet of a human being that is able to relate to God. It is the spirit that allows humanity to actually engage God—a spiritual being—in significant relationship. It is on the level of spiritual being that the human-divine intersection occurs. The spirit enables humanity to relate to God, the very purpose for which it was created. This is because, in Simpson’s mind, the spirit is not merely an elevated aspect of a human being; rather, the human spirit is divine in its primordial nature.[48] While he quickly qualified the meaning of his assertion to the cognizance of spiritual matters, he stated that the spirit of humanity is of a divine nature and of a divine source distinct from that of the human body and soul.
The Necessity of Jesus’ Divine Spirit
The evidence that may lead one to conclude that Simpson’s Christology is Apollinarian is found primarily when he addresses two different issues. The first is found within his Christology proper and the second in his soteriology, especially when he discusses the work of sanctification and its goal of humanity gaining of the “very same” mind of Christ.
While the direct Christological assertions are scarce, they exist. Simpson, like Apollinaris, noted, first of all, that Christ was a trichotomous being,[49] that he possessed a body, soul, and spirit. Yet, it is not clear that Simpson asserted that Christ possessed a human spirit or that this spirit was human in any way. He is clear that he did, however, possess a divine spirit/mind. Simpson referred to the “mind of Christ” as “infinite”[50] on one occasion and as “glorious”[51] on another. If this were the extent of Simpson’s assertion, the charge of Apollinarianism would die of malnutrition. Yet, such is not the case. The more compelling case comes from Simpson’s soteriology.
In his soteriology, as stated earlier, Simpson emphasized the necessity of the believer acquiring the mind of Christ. It is essential to the pursuit of sanctification. This mind of Christ is, in fact, what Simpson otherwise described as the spirit of Christ. It is that which grasps the loftier truths of God and enables community with him. It is in gaining the “mind of Christ” that humanity gains (or regains) the proper organ for these two related pursuits. It is only through the acquisition and engagement of the mind of Christ that humanity can understand divine revelation and, therefore, respond appropriately to it. It is only through the gaining of the mind of Christ that humanity can know God and it is only through the possession and employment of the mind of Christ that humanity can commune with God, especially to that degree for which they were created.
The reason that Simpson repeatedly gave for the effectiveness of this mind of Christ in these areas is that it is a divine mind. Only a divine mind has the capacity and capability necessary to understand the things of God and to commune with him. By gaining the mind of Christ, Simpson noted, he was not referring to just agreement or conformity to the mind of Christ. It is not just that humanity is to think and reason in a godly or Christ-like fashion. His understanding is much more literal. It is, rather, Christ’s very own mind, his very own capacities and capabilities that humanity is to gain. It is not simply the resuscitation, resurrection, or glorification of a human mind/spirit that is in view here. It is, rather, the actual and mystical infusion of Christ’s very own mind/spirit that is in order. Furthermore, Simpson was clear that with the importation of this divine mind of Christ the human spirit, if it continues to exist at all, is practically eliminated. It is “decapitated” from its place as the head over the rest of the human constitution. Simpson provided no clear reason as to why this elimination is necessary. He simply asserted, as though it were common sense, that it is.
Ultimately, however, Simpson’s point is clear. There is no room in the human constitution for two minds/spirits. It is simply that to have the mind of Christ necessarily means the removal of the human mind/spirit. All that can exist in any human, according to Simpson, is one or the other. It is an either/or proposition, not both/and. The mind of Christ was clearly divine and, therefore, not human.
Critiques
The question naturally arises, then, about whether Simpson’s Christology is heretical. Is it not a modern Apollinarianism? Is it not, as some may put it, a form of docetism? If the mind of Christ is a solely divine mind, does Simpson’s Christ not merely appear to be fully human? One will search Simpson’s writings in vain for comments that explicitly assert the duality of the mind/spirit of Christ. Its singularity, however, is strongly implied. Simpson never spoke about the minds or the spirits of Christ. Rather, he spoke about it in the singular only. It is always the mind of Christ, without equivocation and without qualification.
When it comes to the issue of this mind’s/spirit’s nature, Simpson was much more explicit. Clearly and frequently, he asserted that the mind of Christ is fully divine. The mind of Christ bore, by nature and perfectly, those capabilities and capacities necessary for the knowledge of and for relationship with God. While Simpson granted that Christ possessed a human intellect and human emotions, he clearly identified these as properties of Christ’s human “soul” and not of Christ’s “spirit.” Consequently, there is, in Simpson, a seeming lack of real hypostatic union, as traditionally defined, especially as it relates to the mind/spirit of Christ. What seems to exist, instead, is the cohabitation of the human and divine in the person of Jesus Christ—a human body and soul, accommodating a divine mind. The mind of the divine Christ is infused into the otherwise human Jesus without real conjunction. According to the classic categories, it would seem, Simpson’s Christology is lacking. Other than protests regarding his Christological orthodoxy, there is nothing within Simpson’s writings that would lead one to conclude otherwise. If such a categorization is correct, then Simpson’s soteriology suffers the same fatal shortcomings as Apollinarianism. That is, if in the Incarnation Christ did not take on the wholeness of the human constitution, that aspect that is most distinctly human has not been redeemed.
Historically, Apollinarianism has been criticized as much for its anthropology as it was for its Christology. That is, some have stated that Apollinaris erred when he asserted that humanity was a trichotomy of body, soul, and spirit rather than a dichotomy of body and soul. Some have suggested that it was primarily its association with Apollinarian heresy that led to trichotomism’s falling out of theological fashion.
Conclusion
Unlike many of his day, Simpson had an unusually high opinion of the potential for human existence. In a previous work, I have shown how, in his doctrine of sanctification, Simpson’s doctrine of sanctification closely resembles the Eastern doctrine of theosis. For Simpson, the divine work of sanctification includes and, indeed, depends upon the endivinization of humanity, that is, the deep, penetrating, and mystical life of Christ Himself within the believer from which the believer draws his very life. Simpson referred to this life variously as the highest Christian life, the divine life, and the Christ life, among others. For Simpson, this endivinized life of constant dependence upon and communion with Christ was not to be the occasional privilege of a mere few. Rather, this divine life was the very telos of human existence, its raison d'être. It was the very purpose for which humanity was created, the intimate, incarnate residence of the divine within—not merely with—humanity.
The product of sanctification, however, is not the only occasion when Simpson believed humanity was endivinized. According to Simpson, this divine life was not only something which was humanity’s telos and the goal of salvation; it was also humanity’s elemental condition. According to Simpson, there was something of endivinization in the created constitution of humanity. This something, he believed, was its primordial spirit. He noted from the creation account of Genesis 2 that the rest of the human condition—the body and soul—was derived from and was part of the created order. The human spirit, however, was not only given to humanity by God himself in a work of creation distinct from that which resulted in the body and soul, but it was itself received immediately from God. Consequently, the human spirit was, in its very nature, something not only of divine origin but, at least to some degree, something of divine nature. It was of a different nature than the rest of the human constitution. The body and soul were natural; the spirit was supernatural, even divine.
The Fall, however, had a devastating, if not fatal effect upon this spirit. While humanity was created a trichotomous being, the Fall effectively “blighted”[52] the human spirit—leaving only the body and soul operational, and even these not properly so. Consequently, in addition to losing the guiding influence of the spirit over the rest of the human constitution, the destruction of the spirit meant that humanity was no longer able to know or to commune with God. While the Fall left humanity in want of relationship with God, this condition was the direct result of its “want of spiritual organs.”[53] If humanity was to know God, as it was created to do, it would need to have a new spirit placed within it, a spirit like the one it had prior to the Fall. The saving work of Jesus Christ sought to respond to this want. It did not merely seek humanity’s justification and regeneration; its goal was its endivinization, if not its re-endivinization.
As such, Simpson’s soteriology is clearly theotic. It is, on the one hand, transformative. It changes humanity from something that it was not into something else. It endivinizes a humanity that was not (immediately) previously so. Yet, if one grants Simpson’s anthropology, that of a humanity originally constituted in part by a divine spirit, it is also restorative. It seeks to return to humanity its created nature and, consequently, move it toward its divinely intended possibilities and the telos inherent in such an existence. Such an equipping was necessary if humanity was to be able to fulfill God’s intention for it—to love him and to enjoy him forever. Spiritual equipment of a lower level, as noted previously, is inadequate to fulfill this mandate—humanity’s raison d’être. A divine spirit is necessary for the right living of a human life; it is neither merely a blessed addendum nor an option. The especially disastrous effects of the Fall lie in the relative ruin of this spirit, the consequent loss of its capacities and capabilities, and humanity’s inability to be what it was created to be. If the goal of salvation is to, at least, restore humanity to its elemental state and to the depth of relation with God for which it was intended, then this would necessarily involve providing humanity with a divine spirit.
The question remains. Is Simpson Apollinarian? Like Apollinaris, Simpson’s anthropology is trichotomous; humanity is constituted of a physical body, a sensate soul, and a spirit, each aspect related to but distinct from one another. For some, Simpson’s trichotomism necessarily leads him down the Apollinarian path. Furthermore, he asserted the one-mindedness of Christ, that is, that Christ possessed one mind, not two, one divine and one human. While Simpson made no explicit case for this, it was, at least, assumed by him. Finally, Simpson asserted the sole divine nature of that one mind of Christ. It was not human and it was not a tertium quid. On these three essential aspects of an Apollinarian Christology, it seems, Simpson stands guilty. Yet, it would seem, at least in the case of Simpson, that there is more to be considered.
While the question of heresy is certainly related to the charge of Apollinarianism, it is another question. The charge of heresy leveled against Apollinarianism does not stand or fall solely on Christological grounds. The question of anthropology is very much involved. The charge of heresy and its practical implications are based, at least in part, on the question of representation. If Christ is not fully human—human in all dimensions, no more and no less—he cannot represent humanity. Classic Christian soteriology demands that the mediator be of those seeking redemption. The ancients argued that this was necessary because that which was not taken up cannot be redeemed. If Christ, therefore, was not fully human, he cannot redeem humanity.
Unlike most, Simpson does not assume that humanity is essentially constituted of a “merely” human mind/spirit. Even Apollinaris seemed to assume the humanity of the essential human mind/spirit. Certainly, his opponents did. For Simpson, however, the human being is, essentially, constituted of a divine mind. To possess such a mind is not alien to a human being. According to Simpson, both in the age to come and by primordial nature, humanity’s mind/spirit is not, in a sense, human. It is divine. The mind/spirit currently possessed by humanity, with all of its limitations, is not an aspect of essential humanity. Rather, it is a consequence of the Fall. It is, in one sense, a less-than-human mind/spirit. Christ, then, in his possession of a divine mind, while different from the rest of current humanity, is not non-human. If one grants Simpson’s anthropology, then, his Apollinarian Christ does fully represent humanity—at least essential, pre-Fall humanity. This Christ, with the divine mind is the human, essentially, that the rest of the race is called to be. Such a high view of Christ is hardly a new or obtuse idea, even within the realm of orthodoxy. The charge of heresy and the charge of theological inadequacy against Simpson can only be sustained if Simpson’s anthropology is shown to be heretical. That, however, is another question.
[1] J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, Second Edition (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), 289.
[2] Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 289.
[3] Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, First Edition (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1984), s.v. "Apollinarianism," by V. L. Walter, 67.
[4] George Dionysus Dragas, "The Anti-Apollinarist Christology of St. Gregory of Nyssa: A First Analysis," The Greek Orthodox Theological Review (Brookline, MA) 42, 3-4 (1997): 299.
[5] “. . . no one else ever produced so pithy, balanced, fertile, religious and scriptural a statement of the Catholic doctrine of God.” G. L. Prestige, Fathers and Heretics: Six Studies in Dogmatic Faith with Prologue and Epilogue (London: SPCK, 1954), 102.
[6] Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 293. Kenneth Wesche asserted, “Apollinaris was the only fourth century Christian thinker, other than Theodore of Mopsuestia, to take the Trinitarian usage of hypostasis and apply it to Christology.” Kenneth Paul Wesche, "The Union of God and Man in Jesus Christ in the Thought of Gregory of Nazianzus," St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly 28, 2 (1984): 84.
[7] One author asserts that Apollinaris was truly heretical, but his heresy was not intentional and occurred only much later in his life. Prestige, Fathers and Heretics, 94, 100.
[8] Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 290.
[9] Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 289.
[10] Kenneth Paul Wesche, "'Mind' and 'Self' in the Christology of Saint Gregory the Theologian: Saint Gregory's Contribution to Christology and Christian Anthropology," The Greek Orthodox Theological Review 39, 1 (Spring 1994): 36.
[11] Quoting Apollinaris from Ad Diocaes, 2. Hans Lietzmann, Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1904), 256; Charles E. Raven, Apollinarianism: An Essay on the Christology of the Early Church (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1923), 184.
[12] Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 289.
[13] Raven, Apollinarianism, 184.
[14] Prestige, Fathers and Heretics, 109.
[15] Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 289.
[16] Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 296.
[17] Wesche, "The Union of God and Man in Jesus Christ," 88; Kenneth Paul Wesche, "'Mind' and 'Self'," 36.
[18] Simpson even asserted that there is no more important question than the question Christ Himself asked in Caesarea Phillipi, “What think ye of Christ?’ This, he believed, is the greatest question of earth and heaven.” Albert B. Simpson, Evangelistic Addresses (New York: Christian Alliance Publishing, 1926), 78.
[19] On at least one occasion, Simpson not only denies Apollinarianism, but denies its orthodoxy. Albert B. Simpson, John, Christ in the Bible (New York: Alliance Press, 1904), 43f.
[20] Albert B. Simpson, The Christ Life (New York: Christian Alliance Publishing, 1925), 111.
[21] Albert B. Simpson, Christ in the Tabernacle (Camp Hill: Christian Publications, 1985), 13.
[22] Albert B. Simpson, "Veins of Truth in the Mines of God: The Deity of Jesus," Living Truths 5, 4 (April 1905): 200. cf. Albert B. Simpson, The Christ of the Forty Days (New York: Christian Alliance Publishing, 1890), 44, 45; Simpson, Christ in the Tabernacle, 94.
[23] “Apart from him we cannot understand or know God;” Albert B. Simpson, The Highest Christian Life: Exposition of the Letter to the Ephesians (South Nyack: Christian Alliance Publishing, 1898), 55.
[24] Albert B. Simpson, John, 37.
[25] Albert B. Simpson, The Lord for the Body: With Questions and Answers on Divine Healing (New York: Christian Alliance Publishing, 1925), 115; Simpson, The Christ Life, 14, 22; Albert B. Simpson, A Larger Christian Life (Harrisburg: Christian Publications, 1979), 42.
[26] Simpson, The Christ of the Forty Days, 12, 36.
[27] Albert B. Simpson, Genesis and Exodus, vol. 1, Christ in the Bible (New York: Word, Work, and World Publishing Co., 1888), 79.
[28] Simpson, The Christ of the Forty Days, 36; Albert B. Simpson, "Veins of Truth in the Mines of God: The Deity of Jesus," chap. in Living Truths, 5:6 (June 1905): 332f; Simpson, Genesis and Exodus, 79.
[29] Albert B. Simpson, Echoes of the New Creation: Messages of the Cross, the Resurrection and the Coming Glory (New York: Alliance Press, 1903), 67.
[30] Simpson, Christ in the Tabernacle, 66.
[31] Albert B. Simpson, Life More Abundantly (New York: Christian Alliance Publishing, 1912), 31.
[32] Simpson, The Highest Christian Life, 61.
[33] Simpson, The Highest Christian Life, 44.
[34] Simpson, Christ in the Tabernacle, 13.
[35] Albert B. Simpson, The Holy Spirit, or Power from on High: An Unfolding of the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the Old and New Testaments, vol. 2. (Nyack: Christian Alliance Publishing, 1924), 94.
[36] Simpson, The Christ Life, 111; Simpson, Life More Abundantly, 28.
[37] Simpson, Genesis and Exodus, 79.
[38] Simpson, John, 43.
[39] Simpson, Evangelistic Addresses, 86.
[40] He noted that such is the division prescribed by Scripture. Albert B. Simpson, Wholly Sanctified (New York: Christian Alliance Publishing, 1893), 25.
[41] Simpson, Wholly Sanctified, 25.
[42] Simpson, Wholly Sanctified, 26.
[43] Simpson, The Holy Spirit, vol. 2, 29.
[44] Albert B. Simpson, Isaiah, Christ in the Bible (Harrisburg: Christian Publications, n.d), 163; Albert B. Simpson, Matthew, Mark, and Luke, Christ in the Bible (New York: Christian Alliance Publishing, 1889), 197.
[45] Simpson, The Holy Spirit, vol. 2, 29.
[46] Albert B. Simpson, "The Commencement and Laying of the Cornerstone of the Wilson Memorial Academy," The Christian and Missionary Alliance, July 4, 1908, 231.
[47] Simpson, The Holy Spirit, vol. 2, 111, 112; “The mere powers of the human intellect cannot find God.” Simpson, Highest Christian Life, 37.
[48] Albert B. Simpson, The Holy Spirit, or Power from on High: An Unfolding of the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the Old and New Testaments, vol. 1 (Nyack: Christian Alliance Publishing, 1924), 28, 29; Simpson, Evangelistic Addresses, 15.
[49] While his terminology is not consistent, Simpson’s assertion of Christ’s trichotomous nature is clear. “The Lord Jesus Christ in his incarnate life was a perfect man with a ‘true’ body and a ‘reasonable soul,’ and if His inner life was normal it involved the possession of a spiritual nature and a soul or mind.” Simpson, Life More Abundantly, 28.
[50] Albert B. Simpson, "The Message of Easter," Living Truths 6, 4 (April 1906): 201.
[51] Albert B. Simpson, The Names of Jesus (New York: Christian Alliance Publishing, 1892), 151.
[52] Albert B. Simpson, "Kirjath-Sepher, or The Mind of Christ," The Christian Alliance and Missionary Weekly, December 15, 1893, 371.
[53] Simpson, The Holy Spirit, vol. 2, 112.
